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Abstract
Freud's legacy deriving from his work The project for a scientific psychology (1895) could give a
new impetus to the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neurosciences. A rapproachment phase
is warrented. Based on the work of psychoanalysts who are themselves neuroscientists (such as
Mauro Mancia, Martha Koukkou and Harold Shevrin) or have a long term dialogue with
neuroscientists (Arnold Modell), three points of epistemological congruence are described:
1. dualism is no longer a satisfactory solution
2. cautions for the centrality of interpretation (hermeneutics)
3. the self-criticism of neuroscientists
Introduction
"Psychoanalysis is unjustly reproached, gentlemen, for
leading to purely psychological theories of pathological
problems. The emphasis which it lays on the pathogenic
role of sexuality, which, after all, is certainly not an exclu-
sively psychical factor, should alone protect it from this
reproach. Psychoanalysts never forget that the mental is
based on the organic, although their work can only carry
them as far as this basis and not beyond it." This is not my
introduction. It is an excerpt from a lecture delivered by
Freud in 1910[1]. At a considerable distance from his even
earlier Project for a Scientific Psychology(1895) [2], reflec-
tion remains open. At the dusk of the nineteenth century,
Freud had attempted to address the unsolved issue of the
definition of mental function in terms of neural function
or a wider connection of the psychic with brain function
with his Project[2]. Having kept silent about this work
himself, it was only published in 1950. Intriguingly, sev-
eral neuroscientists and analysts interested in his ideas
have recently attempted to revisit them in the context of
contemporary knowledge. Mancia[3], reads more psy-
chology rather than biology into it, a tendency to "mental-
ize" neurons. Others find different parts of the Freudian
text interesting (for instance, as regards synapses and the
time lag between entry and exit of sensory information,
i.e. behaviour)[4,5] and believe they still carry weight
today.
Of course, the issue with Freud's Project is not whether
some of its positions have been confirmed whilst others
are completely outdated. What matters is the legacy left
behind for reflection and method. The integration of the
findings of psychoanalysis with those of neuroscience
remains an open question. Therefore, Freud's legacy can
give a new impetus to the endeavour of reformulating, in
the light of current knowledge, the assumption that "psy-
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chical processes run parallel to the physiological ones",
that they are "dependent concomitant"[6]. It is the
author's opinion that this legacy is understood by psycho-
analysts who are themselves researchers in the field of
neurosciences far better than by others. Shevrin[7], Man-
cia [3], and Koukkou[8] are inspired to integrate their two
divergent disciplines: the discipline of the unconscious
mind and the science of brain function. Alongside them is
the recent work of Arnold Modell[9,10]. These authors
speak in modern psychoanalytic language through the
lens of the latest insights of neurobiology.
We are also aware that twenty years after the "Project"
Freud would argue that "we are taken a step further – we
do not know how much – by the discovery of the unequal
importance of the different parts of the brain and their
special relations to particular parts of the body and to par-
ticular mental activities. But every attempt to go on from
there to discover a localization of mental processes, every
endeavor to think of ideas as stored up in nervecells and
of excitations are traveling along nerve-fibers has miscar-
ried completely"[11]. This formulation reflects his fertile
turn from the Project to the Interpretation of Dreams [12].
In taking this turn, he may be thought to have accepted
again "dualism": body/psyche, brain/mind, nature/nur-
ture. It was a new possibility that allowed:
a. the formulation of psychoanalytic methodology and
theory,
b. the construction of the analytic object, and,
c. the development of a technique.
The basic links here are the unconscious and transference.
One aspect of Freud's genius, as Spector-Person points out
(1989) [13], is that he managed to remain a materialist
although his only field of research was the unconscious.
His biological suggestions had to wait for developments
in the natural sciences. Freud held on firmly to this view
as we know from his references in several texts. But he also
oscillated constantly between dualism in etiology and an
integrated model.
There are many analysts who argue that today psychoanal-
ysis is once again approaching the neurosciences, but also
the reverse, namely that it is neuroscientists who are look-
ing for the lost "mind". An illustration of this can be
found in Kandel's American Journal of Psychiatry arti-
cle[14], which advances a framework for an encounter
between psychoanalysis and neurobiology. Herein I pro-
pose a rapprochement phase between the two disciplines (I
borrow the term from Mahler's work), following a long
period of splitting, as occurs in developmental phases of
the human being. Prompted by the writings of psychoan-
alyst/neuroscientists, three reasons for rapproachment
spring to mind.
About dualism in brain-mind dichotomy
First of all, in the field of epistemology, dualism is no longer
a satisfactory solution. The fragmentation of human exist-
ence or psychoanalysis in complete isolation from the rest
of thescientific world ("we study the psychological causes,
the othersthe "organic" ones") can have no place in criti-
cal scientificdialogue, although endorsing dualism can be
reassuring andinspiring for the treating psychoanalyst. In
their routineanalytic work, psychoanalysts are concerned
exclusively withmental function. However, the basis of so-
called "mental" phenomena results from combined rather
than independent processes in the brain and in the mind.
Pointing out the complexity of coherence of brain and
mind, Koukou posits experience dependent brain plastic-
ity as a key concept for studying non-conscious deci-
sions[8]. Molecular mechanisms "translate the human-
specific experiences based on innate knowledge about
what supports well-being and what disturbs well-being
into the neural architecture of the experience-dependent
synaptic plasticity (the cortico-cortical connectivity) of the
neocortex and herewith extract personal meaning and cre-
ate biography"[15]. This is how the plasticity of the brain,
its ability to assimilate and dynamically interact with
human experience, mainly autobiography, is understood.
One might conclude that the idea that psychological
problems are entirely the result of innate faults in the bio-
logical substratum follows from a failure of human sci-
ences (and classical neuroscientists) to
evaluatepsychoanalytic insights. Particularly those
insights regarding theimportance of misunderstandings
and dysfunctions in archaicrelationships of the individual
with their environment for their dynamically developing
brain.
The brain participates in the creation of human meaning.
This insight has been developed by Modell as may be seen
in his books The Private Self"[9] and Imagination and the
meaningful brain [10]. The separation of science on the one
hand from the interpretation of meaning on the other is
flawed – not only because psychoanalysis brings the sub-
ject's meaning to the forefront of its investigation but also
because by linking it to unconscious emotions it links it to
a biological framework. Modell highlighted much earlier
the importance of the Freudian theory of "nachträgli-
chkeit", i.e. of the retranscription of memory in the psy-
choanalytic work of revealing meaning [9]. It is a theory
that Edelman, a researcher of memory from the biological
perspective, set out in the same terms for the central nerv-
ous system without having studied Freud. Memory is not
a fixed transcription in the brain, isomorphic with past
experience. Rather, it is a dynamic reconstruction associ-
ated with context and classified in categories [16]. Let usPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:25 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/25
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recall what Freud wrote to Fliess in 1896. "The material
present in the shape of memory-traces is from time to
time subjected to a rearrangement in accordance with
fresh circumstances – is, as it were, transcribed. Thus, what
is new in my theory is the thesis that memory is present
not once but several times over, that it is registered in var-
ious species of "signs"[17]. Edelman's neural approach is,
in this instance, congruent with Freud's psychoanalytic
theory of memory and repetition. For Modell, these
insights have implications for the theory of instincts and
the mental apparatus as well, issues which are critical for
psychoanalysts but which go beyond the scope of this
paper [9].
Apart from humans, Modell cites modern research which
demonstrates that meaning is fully individualized even in
animals. [9] In humans, insights such as these imply
emerging insights into the unconscious, and recall psy-
choanalyst Bollas formulation of the "unthought known"
[18]: A mental state that has not become a thought yet but
consists of non-verbal memories from archaic relation-
ships which become known through the interaction of
transference and counter transference and the analyst's
"experiences". What are the implications of these insights?
The "congruence" of psychoanalytic and neurobiological
findings implies that neuroscientists should recognize
what is psychoanalytically obvious (for instance, the
"unthought unknown" or unconscious feelings) and can
be meaningfully inspired by it or use it as a theoretical
basis for integrated research.
This brings us, as Shevrin points out, to another epistemo-
logical problem: Neurobiological studies lack a "funda-
mental hypothesis," they lack integrity of "mind" and a
"coherent story" of the subject[7]. Although human neu-
robiology belongs to the human sciences, often it does
not talk about the human story. But equally, it is impor-
tant for psychoanalysis to restore its relations with the
biological and to do so in modern terms. Otherwise psy-
choanalysis runs the risk of being cut-off from the biolog-
ical level and of becoming just another psychological
theory. Psychoanalysis is at the same time a meta theory
which by definition (by Freud himself) aims at connect-
ing the biological substratum with mental functioning.
Interpretation vs relationship
The second reason for rapproachment between psychoan-
alyis and neuroscience is the limitation of the omnipotence
of interpretation (and, in this sense, the problem of a theo-
logical type of psychoanalysis). Motivation for rapproach-
ment here comes from cultural change as well as from
changes in methods of psychoanalytic research. Psychoa-
nalysis itself is changing. There is now more recognition
of:
a. resistance to change and the negative therapeutic reac-
tion,
b. the contribution of preverbal traumas and of the earli-
est phases of development in psychopathology, and,
c. intersubjective construction of meaning.
Beyond a history of splits and differences in terminology
which make the psychoanalytic community look like
Babel, the above issues lie at the heart of this essay. This
might be the reason that projective identification (both as
a normal and a pathological process) has gradually
touched almost every psychoanalyst. Mostly in the form
of the "theoretical model" in which it was cast by Bion
[19].
The analysand affects the analyst not only through associ-
ations but also through the feelings he/she projects. Pro-
jective identification is an alternative, albeit primitive,
way of communication of feelings and impressions that a
patient cannot tolerate and capture in words. Through this
communication in the analytic situation we suppose that
the patient will bring pressure to bear on the analyst. Bion
described and distinguished normal projective identifica-
tion as a primitive way of communication from different
types of pathological (or excessive) projective identifica-
tion [19,20]. The latter is at work when mind is evacuated
of contents, as in the case of destructive and acting out
behaviours or in hallucinations. Bion also assumed that
there is a mental function of personality, calling it alpha-
function, which transforms sense impressions and archaic
feelings into elements of mental domain. These elements,
called alpha elements, are the stuff of dream images in
sleep or of unconscious thoughts in the state of wakeful-
ness. What takes shape in the analyst's mind has to do also
with the analysand's non-verbal "experience", especially
when evacuation rather than thinking is at work. When
alpha function is defective, as in the case of severe psycho-
pathology, evacuation prevails (via pathological projec-
tive identifications) and internal processing of feelings is
impossible.
Any change of the technique must be based on the ana-
lysts' ability to contain and process in their own minds
and thus achieve a re-introjection by the patient of those
mentally non-metabolized emotional and sensory stim-
uli. Something more than the interpretation of mental
conflicts, this is the current consensus about what charac-
terizes psychoanalysis as a therapy. More recently Gab-
bard and Westen emphasize that the therapeutic action of
psychoanalysis depends more on constructions in the here
and now of the analytic relationship than to reconstruc-
tions of the past [21].Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:25 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/25
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With this "plasticity" of new hypotheses and individua-
tion ("each patient is unique" or, as Modell put it, "we
produce fantasies that are unique to us"), psychoanalysis
remains and continues to be recognized by many as the
most coherent and integrated model for investigating the
"mind". In the Mancia's text it is argued that the task of the
psychoanalyst today is to transform symbolically and
render verbalizable the implicit mechanisms of the unre-
pressed unconscious. Verified in the neurobiological field,
this thesis gives impetus to the clinical level, most of all,
to the analytic approach to patients who do not change.
The clinical example presented by Mancia confirms the
possibility of achieving, in the course of analytic therapy,
at a slow pace admittedly, acquisition of form and modi-
fication of those elements patients are unable to tell or
remember.
Neuroscientists searching for mind
The third reason for rapproachment, I presume, lies in a
certain self-criticism by neuroscientists. I cannot argue with
certainty that, following the "decade of the brain",
supremacy of the model of reductionism ("mental phe-
nomena are only conscious as products of neurons") and
the feeling of omnipotence associated with it have
retreated. However, at least judging from recent publica-
tions from Kandel and Shrevin, it would seem that their
rivalry with Freud, typical of the last decade of the twenti-
eth century, has begun to subside. Unconscious mental
conflict exists, Shevrin tells us, for it has been demon-
strated that on the biological level the so-called resting
state of mind (lack of stimuli) is characterized, on the con-
trary, by intense neural activity and functioning. His
experimental research is an invitation for cooperation
between psychoanalysts and neuroscientists. Shevrin
believes that this partnership, through integrated proto-
cols, can advance knowledge of the "neuroscience of emo-
tions"[7]. Finally I refer to Nagel who makes an integrated
statement [22] "The mental and physiological concepts
and their reference to this same inner phenomenon
would then be seen as secondary and each partial in its
grasp of the phenomenon: each would be seen as referring
to something that extends beyond its ground of applica-
tion".
Psychoanalysis and neurobiology speak different lan-
guages. Psychoanalysis studies the individual through an
intersubjective relationship. This is its trade mark as a dis-
cipline and shall not be erased by a rapprochement with
neurobiology. As Otto Kernberg said in his opening
speech as president of the 39th Psychoanalytic Confer-
ence held in San Francisco (1995), there are currently two
human sciences investigating the roots of human experi-
ence, psychoanalysis and neurobiology.
A final comment
The investigations of authors working both as analysts
and neuroscientists are going far beyond the level of gen-
eral declarations. We are presented with well documented
proposals on how to combine the insights gained from
the study of the brain with psychoanalytic research. Each
author cited here provides us with knowledge and direc-
tion from their outstanding interdisciplinary research.
What is striking is that their investigations, independent
from each other, meet frequently at several points. Freud's
"Project" (and I mean it in the sense of "legacy") is no
longer utopian.
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